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1. Comment - Could Crypto Resolve the Voting Machine Controversy?

   (Oct 3, 2006 - 4:00 PM)

   Electronic Voting - (can be) Better than a classic ‘paper trail’
   
   Synopsis:
   Voter is assigned and printed a private, random file number which allows voter to check registered votes by internet or telephone (automated voice synthesis). At end of voting day, sorted file numbers are assigned internal positions (1 through total number of voters). The voter files are then available to the public per these position numbers.
   
   Details:
   When voter ‘starts’ (first interaction with machine) a random file number (6 digits or more) is generated from a fast free-running roll-over counter (same system as slot machines). While the voter is voting (touch screen, most likely) this number is sorted against previous file numbers (in the very unlikely event (1/million) that the number is already assigned, the voter will be asked to reinitiate). The file number is printed on a receipt/coupon as well as displayed (privately) on the machine. At the end of the day/voting session, votes are tabulated (as usual) and the sorted (numerical order) file numbers (pointing to each voters’ inputs/decisions) are then also given numerical position numbers (1 for lowest to n the largest where n is also the total number of voters). These voter files are then made available on the internet and/or automated telephone system so that a file can be read by accessing it either by the private file number (random) if and when the voter checks his/her own listing or by the position number which allows anyone to select an anonymous voting record. A news service, if it so desires, can easily write a program to read all the files and thus do their own recount/tally (to check it against the official publicly released post poll closing results). Each voting machine must of course, have a unique identifier prefixing the file and position numbers. Suggestions are the election district number and/or zip code (listings and maps should also be internet available).
   
   Hardware:
   The touch screen voting terminals should also be designed and manufactured per published specifications thus insuring hardware interoperability. The present machines can be used as ‘de facto’ standards to limit the number of hardware configurations (and thus software drivers) needed to be accommodated.
   
   Refinements: (to allow challenges and prevent double sets of records)
   After voting; even before polls are closed, the voter can (and possibly should) check his/her vote either at the polling place or immediately at home. If in error, this would be the most opportune time to challenge. After the polls close it's a different situation; one first checks his/her vote with the 'secret' file number. If the voting record is correct, the voter selects 'yes' (approval) which then releases the voters 'position' number. If 'no' a challenge is indicated (legal means must be developed to deal with this possibility). The voter can then (or later) check the vote record via this 'position' number to give assurances against the existence of two sets of voter records (private 'file' number vs. public 'position' number). During voter record approval, a printout (hardcopy) can be made if desired. If there seems to be errors and a possibility of a challenge exists, the hardcopy should be signed, dated, and possibly notarized and/or witnessed.
   (The primary purpose of this voting system is to prevent this situation from occurring!)
   
   Hard Copy: (the only absolutely required printout would be the voters file number, time/date, and poll location/designation)
   
   Comparatively; public verifiable voting records, as presented in this document, are simple, quick, and easy!